Theory that value judgments, including moral judgments, do not state facts (though they appear to), but are expressions of emotions or attitudes. (Also see: Boo Hurrah Theory.)
The theory, a form of speech act theory, arose under the influence of logical positivism (though it had antecedents in the 18th century) because of the difficulties of finding verification conditions for such utterances, and the need to explain how they can affect behavior.
Emotivism is also a form of subjectivism, but must be distinguished from the subjectivist view that while value judgments do describe something, what they describe are not special moral and such-like facts but human attitudes, whether the speaker’s own or other people’s.
One obvious, though not necessarily insuperable, difficulty is that of accounting adequately for moral argument and moral disagreement.
C L Stevenson, Ethics and Language (1944)
Emotivism reached prominence in the early 20th century, but it was born centuries earlier. In 1710, George Berkeley wrote that language in general often serves to inspire feelings as well as communicate ideas. Decades later, David Hume espoused ideas similar to Stevenson’s later ones. In his 1751 book An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, Hume considered morality not to be related to fact but “determined by sentiment”:
In moral deliberations we must be acquainted beforehand with all the objects, and all their relations to each other; and from a comparison of the whole, fix our choice or approbation. … While we are ignorant whether a man were aggressor or not, how can we determine whether the person who killed him be criminal or innocent? But after every circumstance, every relation is known, the understanding has no further room to operate, nor any object on which it could employ itself. The approbation or blame which then ensues, cannot be the work of the judgement, but of the heart; and is not a speculative proposition or affirmation, but an active feeling or sentiment.
G. E. Moore published his Principia Ethica in 1903 and argued that the attempts of ethical naturalists to translate ethical terms (like good and bad) into non-ethical ones (like pleasing and displeasing) committed the “naturalistic fallacy”. Moore was a cognitivist, but his case against ethical naturalism steered other philosophers toward noncognitivism, particularly emotivism.
The emergence of logical positivism and its verifiability criterion of meaning early in the 20th century led some philosophers to conclude that ethical statements, being incapable of empirical verification, were cognitively meaningless. This criterion was fundamental to A.J. Ayer’s defense of positivism in Language, Truth and Logic, which contains his statement of emotivism. However, positivism is not essential to emotivism itself, perhaps not even in Ayer’s form, and some positivists in the Vienna Circle, which had great influence on Ayer, held non-emotivist views.
R. M. Hare unfolded his ethical theory of universal prescriptivism in 1952’s The Language of Morals, intending to defend the importance of rational moral argumentation against the “propaganda” he saw encouraged by Stevenson, who thought moral argumentation was sometimes psychological and not rational. But Hare’s disagreement was not universal, and the similarities between his noncognitive theory and the emotive one — especially his claim, and Stevenson’s, that moral judgments contain commands and are thus not purely descriptive — caused some to regard him as an emotivist, a classification he denied:
I did, and do, follow the emotivists in their rejection of descriptivism. But I was never an emotivist, though I have often been called one. But unlike most of their opponents I saw that it was their irrationalism, not their non-descriptivism, which was mistaken. So my main task was to find a rationalist kind of non-descriptivism, and this led me to establish that imperatives, the simplest kinds of prescriptions, could be subject to logical constraints while not [being] descriptive.
Influential statements of emotivism were made by C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards in their 1923 book on language, The Meaning of Meaning, and by W. H. F. Barnes and A. Duncan-Jones in independent works on ethics in 1934. However, it is the later works of Ayer and especially Stevenson that are the most developed and discussed defenses of the theory.
A. J. Ayer
A. J. Ayer’s version of emotivism is given in chapter six, “Critique of Ethics and Theology”, of Language, Truth and Logic. In that chapter, Ayer divides “the ordinary system of ethics” into four classes:
- “Propositions that express definitions of ethical terms, or judgements about the legitimacy or possibility of certain definitions”
- “Propositions describing the phenomena of moral experience, and their causes”
- “Exhortations to moral virtue”
- “Actual ethical judgments”
He focuses on propositions of the first class—moral judgments—saying that those of the second class belong to science, those of the third are mere commands, and those of the fourth (which are considered in normative ethics as opposed to meta-ethics) are too concrete for ethical philosophy. While class three statements were irrelevant to Ayer’s brand of emotivism, they would later play a significant role in Stevenson’s.
Ayer argues that moral judgments cannot be translated into non-ethical, empirical terms and thus cannot be verified; in this he agrees with ethical intuitionists. But he differs from intuitionists by discarding appeals to intuition as “worthless” for determining moral truths, since the intuition of one person often contradicts that of another. Instead, Ayer concludes that ethical concepts are “mere pseudo-concepts”:
The presence of an ethical symbol in a proposition adds nothing to its factual content. Thus if I say to someone, “You acted wrongly in stealing that money,” I am not stating anything more than if I had simply said, “You stole that money.” In adding that this action is wrong I am not making any further statement about it. I am simply evincing my moral disapproval of it. It is as if I had said, “You stole that money,” in a peculiar tone of horror, or written it with the addition of some special exclamation marks. … If now I generalise my previous statement and say, “Stealing money is wrong,” I produce a sentence that has no factual meaning—that is, expresses no proposition that can be either true or false. … I am merely expressing certain moral sentiments.
Ayer agrees with subjectivists in saying that ethical statements are necessarily related to individual attitudes, but he says they lack truth value because they cannot be properly understood as propositions about those attitudes; Ayer thinks ethical sentences are expressions, not assertions, of approval. While an assertion of approval may always be accompanied by an expression of approval, expressions can be made without making assertions; Ayer’s example is boredom, which can be expressed through the stated assertion “I am bored” or through non-assertions including tone of voice, body language, and various other verbal statements. He sees ethical statements as expressions of the latter sort, so the phrase “Theft is wrong” is a non-propositional sentence that is an expression of disapproval but is not equivalent to the proposition “I disapprove of theft”.
Having argued that his theory of ethics is noncognitive and not subjective, he accepts that his position and subjectivism are equally confronted by G. E. Moore’s argument that ethical disputes are clearly genuine disputes and not just expressions of contrary feelings. Ayer’s defense is that all ethical disputes are about facts regarding the proper application of a value system to a specific case, not about the value systems themselves, because any dispute about values can only be resolved by judging that one value system is superior to another, and this judgment itself presupposes a shared value system. If Moore is wrong in saying that there are actual disagreements of value, we are left with the claim that there are actual disagreements of fact, and Ayer accepts this without hesitation:
If our opponent concurs with us in expressing moral disapproval of a given type t, then we may get him to condemn a particular action A, by bringing forward arguments to show that A is of type t. For the question whether A does or does not belong to that type is a plain question of fact.
C. L. Stevenson
Stevenson’s work has been seen both as an elaboration upon Ayer’s views and as a representation of one of “two broad types of ethical emotivism.” An analytic philosopher, Stevenson suggested in his 1937 essay “The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms” that any ethical theory should explain three things: that intelligent disagreement can occur over moral questions, that moral terms like good are “magnetic” in encouraging action, and that the scientific method is insufficient for verifying moral claims. Stevenson’s own theory was fully developed in his 1944 book Ethics and Language. In it, he agrees with Ayer that ethical sentences express the speaker’s feelings, but he adds that they also have an imperative component intended to change the listener’s feelings and that this component is of greater importance. Where Ayer spoke of values, or fundamental psychological inclinations, Stevenson speaks of attitudes, and where Ayer spoke of disagreement of fact, or rational disputes over the application of certain values to a particular case, Stevenson speaks of differences in belief; the concepts are the same. Terminology aside, Stevenson interprets ethical statements according to two patterns of analysis.
First pattern analysis
Under his first pattern of analysis an ethical statement has two parts: a declaration of the speaker’s attitude and an imperative to mirror it, so “‘This is good’ means I approve of this; do so as well.“ The first half of the sentence is a proposition, but the imperative half is not, so Stevenson’s translation of an ethical sentence remains a noncognitive one.
Imperatives cannot be proved, but they can still be supported so that the listener understands that they are not wholly arbitrary:
If told to close the door, one may ask “Why?” and receive some such reason as “It is too drafty,” or “The noise is distracting.” … These reasons cannot be called “proofs” in any but a dangerously extended sense, nor are they demonstratively or inductively related to an imperative; but they manifestly do support an imperative. They “back it up,” or “establish it,” or “base it on concrete references to fact.”
The purpose of these supports is to make the listener understand the consequences of the action they are being commanded to do. Once they understand the command’s consequences, they can determine whether or not obedience to the command will have desirable results.
The imperative is used to alter the hearer’s attitudes or actions. … The supporting reason then describes the situation the imperative seeks to alter, or the new situation the imperative seeks to bring about; and if these facts disclose that the new situation will satisfy a preponderance of the hearer’s desires, he will hesitate to obey no longer. More generally, reasons support imperatives by altering such beliefs as may in turn alter an unwillingness to obey.
Second pattern analysis
Stevenson’s second pattern of analysis is used for statements about types of actions, not specific actions. Under this pattern,
‘This is good’ has the meaning of ‘This has qualities or relations X, Y, Z … ,’ except that ‘good’ has as well a laudatory meaning, which permits it to express the speaker’s approval, and tends to evoke the approval of the hearer.
In second-pattern analysis, rather than judge an action directly, the speaker is evaluating it according to a general principle. For instance, someone who says “Murder is wrong” might mean “Murder decreases happiness overall”; this is a second-pattern statement that leads to a first-pattern one: “I disapprove of anything that decreases happiness overall. Do so as well.”
Methods of argumentatio
For Stevenson, moral disagreements may arise from different fundamental attitudes, different moral beliefs about specific cases, or both. The methods of moral argumentation he proposed have been divided into three groups, known as logical, rational psychological and nonrational psychological forms of argumentation.
Logical methods involve efforts to show inconsistencies between a person’s fundamental attitudes and their particular moral beliefs. For example, someone who says “Edward is a good person” who has previously said “Edward is a thief” and “No thieves are good people” is guilty of inconsistency until he retracts one of his statements. Similarly, a person who says “Lying is always wrong” might consider lies in some situations to be morally permissible, and if examples of these situations can be given, his view can be shown to be logically inconsistent.
Rational psychological methods examine facts that relate fundamental attitudes to particular moral beliefs; the goal is not to show that someone has been inconsistent, as with logical methods, but only that they are wrong about the facts that connect their attitudes to their beliefs. To modify the former example, consider the person who holds that all thieves are bad people. If she sees Edward pocket a wallet found in a public place, she may conclude that he is a thief, and there would be no inconsistency between her attitude (that thieves are bad people) and her belief (that Edward is a bad person because he is a thief). However, it may be that Edward recognized the wallet as belonging to a friend, to whom he promptly returned it. Such a revelation would likely change the observer’s belief about Edward, and even if it did not, the attempt to reveal such facts would count as a rational psychological form of moral argumentation.
Non-rational psychological methods revolve around language with psychological influence but no necessarily logical connection to the listener’s attitudes. Stevenson called the primary such method “‘persuasive,’ in a somewhat broadened sense”, and wrote:
[Persuasion] depends on the sheer, direct emotional impact of words—on emotive meaning, rhetorical cadence, apt metaphor, stentorian, stimulating, or pleading tones of voice, dramatic gestures, care in establishing rapport with the hearer or audience, and so on. … A redirection of the hearer’s attitudes is sought not by the mediating step of altering his beliefs, but by exhortation, whether obvious or subtle, crude or refined.
Persuasion may involve the use of particular emotion-laden words, like “democracy” or “dictator”, or hypothetical questions like “What if everyone thought the way you do?” or “How would you feel if you were in their shoes?
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