Performative (or speech act) theory of negation

Theory that analyzes negation in terms of a special kind of linguistic activity, negating or denying; so that to say, for example, ‘It’s not raining’ may indeed be (as anyone would agree in straightforward cases) to deny that it is raining, but is also to utter a sentence which gets its meaning from that very fact.

The alternative view would say one can only deny something by using a sentence that has its meaning independently of any act of denial.

The German logician Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) raised an objection, relevant to other speech act theories too, about what happens when ‘not’ occurs in a clause governed by a phrase like ‘if or ‘I wonder whether’.

He also asked whether utterances such as ‘Christ is immortal’ count as assertions or denials.

Source:
G Frege, ‘Negation’, Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, P T Geach and M Black, eds (1952)

History

For much of the history of the positivist philosophy of language, language was viewed primarily as a way of making factual assertions, and the other uses of language tended to be ignored, as Austin states at the beginning of Lecture 1, “It was for too long the assumption of philosophers that the business of a ‘statement’ can only be to ‘describe’ some state of affairs, or to ‘state some fact’, which it must do either truly or falsely.”[4] Wittgenstein came up with the idea of “don’t ask for the meaning, ask for the use,” showing language as a new vehicle for social activity.[5] Speech act theory hails from Wittgenstein’s philosophical theories. Wittgenstein believed meaning derives from pragmatic tradition, demonstrating the importance of how language is used to accomplish objectives within specific situations. By following rules to accomplish a goal, communication becomes a set of language games. Thus, utterances do more than reflect a meaning, they are words designed to get things done.[6] The work of J. L. Austin, particularly his How to Do Things with Words, led philosophers to pay more attention to the non-declarative uses of language. The terminology he introduced, especially the notions “locutionary act”, “illocutionary act”, and “perlocutionary act”, occupied an important role in what was then to become the “study of speech acts”. All of these three acts, but especially the “illocutionary act”, are nowadays commonly classified as “speech acts”.

Austin was by no means the first one to deal with what one could call “speech acts” in a wider sense. The term ‘social act’ and some of the theory of this sui generis type of linguistic action are to be found in the fifth of Thomas Reid’s Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind (1788, chapter VI, Of the Nature of a Contract).[7]

Adolf Reinach (1883–1917)[8] and Stanislav Škrabec (1844–1918)[9] have been both independently credited with a fairly comprehensive account of social acts as performative utterances dating to 1913, long before Austin and Searle.

The term “Speech Act” had also been already used by Karl Bühler.[10][11]

The term metalocutionary act has also been used to indicate a speech act that refers to the forms and functions of the discourse itself rather than continuing the substantive development of the discourse, or to the configurational functions of prosody and punctuation.[citation needed]

Overview: levels of speech acts

Speech acts can be analysed on three levels:

  1. A locutionary act: the performance of an utterance: the actual utterance and its apparent meaning, comprising any and all of its verbal, social, and rhetorical meanings, all of which correspond to the verbal, syntactic and semantic aspects of any meaningful utterance;
  2. an illocutionary act: the active result of the implied request or meaning presented by the locutionary act. For example, if the locutionary act in an interaction is the question “Is there any salt?” the implied illocutionary request is “Can someone pass the salt to me?”;
  3. and in certain cases a further perlocutionary act: the actual effect of the locutionary and illocutionary acts, such as persuading, convincing, scaring, enlightening, inspiring, or otherwise getting someone to do or realize something, whether intended or not.[1]

Speech acts in action

Speech Acts are commonplace in everyday interactions and are important for communication, as well as present in many different contexts. Examples of these include…

  • “You’re fired!” expresses both the employment status of the individual in question, as well as the action by which said person’s employment is ended.[12]
  • “I hereby appoint you as chairman” expresses both the status of the individual as chairman, and is the action which promotes the individual to this position.[13]
  • “We ask that you extinguish your cigarettes at this time, and bring your tray tables and seatbacks to an upright position.” This statement describes the requirements of the current location, such as an airplane, while also issuing the command to stop smoking and to sit up straight.
  • “Would it be too much trouble for me to ask you to hand me that wrench?” functions to simultaneously ask two questions. The first is to ask the listener if they are capable of passing the wrench, while the second is an actual request.
  • “Well, would you listen to that?” acts as a question, requesting that a listener heed what is being said by the speaker, but also as an exclamation of disbelief or shock.[14]

Illocutionary acts

The concept of an illocutionary act is central to the concept of a speech act. Although there are several scholarly opinions regarding how to define ‘illocutionary acts’, there are some kinds of acts which are widely accepted as illocutionary. Examples of these widely accepted acts are commands or promises.

The first of these opinions is the one held by the man who coined the term “speech act” in his book How to Do Things with Words (published posthumously in 1962),[1] John L. Austin. According to Austin’s preliminary informal description, the idea of an “illocutionary act” can be captured by emphasizing that “by saying something, we do something”, as when someone issues an order to someone to go by saying “Go!”, or when a minister joins two people in marriage saying, “I now pronounce you husband and wife.” (Austin would eventually define the “illocutionary act” in a more exact manner.)

An alternative to Austin’s explanation of the illocutionary act is that given by John R. Searle. According to Searle, a “speech act” is often meant to refer to exactly the same thing as the term illocutionary act. Searle’s work on speech acts is understood to further refine Austin’s conception. However, some philosophers have pointed out a significant difference between the two conceptions: whereas Austin emphasized the conventional interpretation of speech acts, Searle emphasized a psychological interpretation (based on beliefs, intentions, etc.).[15]

Perlocutionary acts

While illocutionary acts relate more to the speaker, perlocutionary acts are centered around the listener. Perlocutionary acts always have a ‘perlocutionary effect’ which is the effect a speech act has on a listener. This could affect the listener’s thoughts, emotions or even their physical actions.[16] An example of this could be if someone uttered the sentence “I’m hungry.” The perlocutionary effect on the listener could be the effect of being persuaded by the utterance. For example, after hearing the utterance, the listener could be persuaded to make a sandwich for the speaker.

Performative speech acts

An interesting type of illocutionary speech act is that performed in the utterance of what Austin calls performatives, typical instances of which are “I nominate John to be President”, “I sentence you to ten years’ imprisonment”, or “I promise to pay you back.” In these typical, rather explicit cases of performative sentences, the action that the sentence describes (nominating, sentencing, promising) is performed by the utterance of the sentence itself. J.L. Austin claimed that performative sentences could be “happy or unhappy”. They were only happy if the speaker does the actions he or she talks about. They were unhappy if this did not happen. Performative speech acts also use explicit verbs instead of implicit ones. For example, stating “I intend to go.” does convey information, but it does not really mean that you are [e.g.] promising to go; so it does not count as “performing” an action (“such as” the action of promising to go). Therefore, it [the word “intend”] is an implicit verb; i.e., a verb that would not be suitable for use in performative speech acts

4 thoughts on “Performative (or speech act) theory of negation

  1. Alonzo Houston says:

    Howdy! I just would like to give an enormous thumbs up for the nice data you’ve gotten right here on this post. I might be coming again to your weblog for more soon.

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published.