Modern science is characterized by its ever-increasing specializa- tion, necessitated by the enormous amount of data, the complexity of techniques and of theoretical structures within every field. Thus science is split into innumerable disciplines continually generating new subdisciplines. In consequence, the physicist, the biologist, the psychologist and the social scientist are, so to speak, encapsulated in their private universes, and it is difficult to get word from one cocoon to the other.
This, however, is opposed by another remarkable aspect. Surveying the evolution of modern science, we encounter a surprising phenomenon. Independently of each other, similar problems and conceptions have evolved in widely different fields.
It was the aim of classical physics eventually to resolve natural phenomena into a play of elementary units governed by “blind” laws of nature. This was expressed in the ideal of the Laplacean spirit which, from the position and momentum of particles, can predict the state of the universe at any point in time. This mechanistic view was not altered but rather reinforced when deterministic laws in physics were replaced by statistical laws. According to Boltzmann’s derivation of the second principle of thermodynamics, physical events are directed toward states of maximum probability, and physical laws, therefore, are essentially “laws of disorder,” the outcome of unordered, statistical events. In contrast to this mechanistic view, however, problems of wholeness, dynamic interaction and organization have appeared in the various branches of modern physics. In the Heisenberg relation and quantum physics, it became impossible to resolve phenomena into local events; problems of order and organization appear whether the question is the structure of atoms, the architecture of proteins, or interaction phenomena in thermodynamics. Similarly biology, in the mechanistic conception, saw its goal in the resolution of life phenomena into atomic entities and partial processes. The living organism was resolved into cells, its activities into physiological and ultimately physicochemical processes, behavior into unconditioned and conditioned reflexes, the substratum of heredity into particulate genes, and so forth. In contradistinction, the organismic. jconception is basic for modern biology. It is necessary to study not only parts and processes in isolation, but also to solve the decisive problems found in the organization and order unifying them, resulting from dynamic interaction of parts, and making the behavior of parts different when studied in isolation or within the whole. Again, similar trends appeared in psychology. While classical association psychology attempted to resolve mental phenomena into elementary units—psychological atoms as it were—such as elementary sensations and the like, gestalt psychology showed the existence and primacy of psychological wholes which are not a summation of elementary units and are governed by dynamic laws. Finally, in the social sciences the concept of society as a sum of individuals as social atoms, e.g., the model of Economic Man, was replaced by the tendency to consider society, economy, nation as a whole superordinated to its parts. This implies the great problems of planned economy, of the deification of nation and state, but also reflects new ways of thinking.
This parallelism of general cognitive principles in different fields is even more impressive when one considers the fact that those developments took place in mutual independence and mostly without any knowledge of work and research in other fields.
There is another important aspect of modern science. Up to recent times, exact science, the corpus of laws of nature, was almost identical with theoretical physics. Few attempts to state exact laws in nonphysical fields have gained recognition. However, the impact of and progress in the biological, behavioral and social sciences seem to make necessary an expansion of our conceptual schemes in order to allow for systems of laws in fields where application of physics is not sufficient or possible.
Such a trend towards generalized theories is taking place/in many fields and in a variety of ways. For example, an elaborate theory of the dynamics of biological populations, the struggle for existence and biological equilibria, has developed, starting with the pioneering work by Lotka and Volterra. The theory operates with biological notions, such as individuals, species, coefficients of competition, and the like. A similar procedure is applied in quantitative economics and econometrics. The models and families of equations applied in the latter happen to be similar to those of Lotka or, for that matter, of chemical kinetics, but the model of interacting entities and forces is again at a different level. To take another example: living organisms are essentially open systems, i.e., systems exchanging matter with their environment. Conventional physics and physical chemistry deal with closed systems, and only in recent years has theory been expanded to include irreversible processes, open systems, and states of dis- equilibrium. If, however, we want to apply the model of open systems to, say, the phenomena of animal growth, we automatically come to a generalization of theory referring not to physical but to biological units. In other words, we are dealing with generalized systems. The same is true of the fields of cybernetics and information theory which have gained so much interest in the past few years.
Thus, there exist models, principles, and laws that apply to generalized systems or their subclasses, irrespective of their particular kind, the nature of their component elements, and the relations or “forces” between them. It seems legitimate to ask for a theory, not of systems of a more or less special kind, but of universal principles applying to systems in general.
In this way we postulate a new discipline called General System Theory. Its subject matter is the formulation and derivation of those principles which are valid for “systems’’ in general.
The meaning of this discipline can be circumscribed as follows. Physics is concerned with systems of different levels of generality.
It extends from rather special systems, such as those applied by the engineer in the construction of a bridge or of a machine; to special laws of physical disciplines, such as mechanics or optics; to laws of great generality, such as the principles of thermodynamics that apply to systems of intrinsically different nature, mechanic, caloric, chemical or whatever. Nothing prescribes that we have to end with the systems traditionally treated in physics. Rather, we can ask for principles applying to systems in general, irrespective of whether they are of physical, biological or sociological nature. If we pose this question and conveniently define the concept of system, we find that models, principles, and laws exist which apply to generalized systems irrespective of their particular kind, elements, and the “forces” involved.
A consequence of the existence of general system properties is the appearance of structural similarities or isomorphisms in different fields. There are correspondences in the principles that govern the behavior of entities that are, intrinsically, widely different. To take a simple example, an exponential law of growth applies to certain bacterial cells, to populations of bacteria, of animals or humans, and to the progress of scientific research measured by the number of publications in genetics or science in general. The entities in question, such as bacteria, animals, men, books, etc., are completely different, and so are the causal mechanisms involved. Nevertheless, the mathematical law is the same. Or there are systems of equations describing the competition of animal and plant species in nature. But it appears that the same systems of equations apply in certain fields in physical chemistry and in economics as well. This correspondence is due to the fact that the entities concerned can be considered, in certain respects, as “systems,” i.e., complexes of elements standing in interaction, The fact that the fields mentioned, and others as well, are concerned with “systems,” leads to a correspondence in general principles and even in special laws when the conditions correspond in the phenomena under consideration.
In fact, similar concepts, models and laws have often appeared in widely different fields, independently and based upon totally different facts. There are many instances where identical principles were discovered several times because the workers in one field were unaware that the theoretical structure required was already well developed in some other field. General system theory will go a long way towards avoiding such unnecessary duplication of labor.
System isomorphisms also appear in problems which are recalcitrant to quantitative analysis but are nevertheless of great intrinsic interest. There are, for example, isomorphies between biological systems and “epiorganisms” (Gerard) like animal communities and human societies. Which principles are common to the several levels of organization and so may legitimately be transferred from one level to another, and which are specific so that transfer leads to dangerous fallacies? Can societies and civilizations be considered as systems?
It seems, therefore, that a general theory of systems would be a useful tool providing, on the one hand, models that can be used in, and transferred to, different fields, and safeguarding, on the other hand, from vague analogies which often have marred the progress in these fields.
There is, however, another and even more important aspect of general system theory. It can be paraphrased by a felicitous formulation due to the well-known mathematician and founder of information theory, Warren Weaver. Classical physics, Weaver said, was highly successful in developing the theory of unorganized complexity. Thus, for example, the behavior of a gas is the result of the unorganized and individually untraceable movements of innumerable molecules; as a whole it is governed by the laws of thermodynamics. The theory of unorganized complexity is ultimately rooted in the laws of chance and probability and in the second law of thermodynamics. In contrast, the fundamental problem today is that of organized complexity. Concepts like those of organization, wholeness, directiveness, teleology, and differentiation are alien to conventional physics. However, they pop up everywhere in the biological, behavioral and social sciences, and are, in fact, indispensable for dealing with living organisms or social groups. Thus a basic problem posed to modern science is a general theory of organization. General system theory is, in principle, capable of giving exact definitions for such concepts and, in suitable cases, of putting them to quantitative analysis.
If we have briefly indicated what general system theory means, it will avoid misunderstanding also to state what it is not. It has been objected that system theory amounts to no more than the trivial fact that mathematics of some sort can be applied to different sorts of problems. For example, the law of exponential growth is applicable to very different phenomena, from radioactive decay to the extinction of human populations with insufficient reproduction. This, however, is so because the formula is one of the simplest differential equations, and can therefore be applied to quite different things. Therefore, if so- called isomorphic laws of growth occur in entirely different processes, it has no more significance than the fact that elementary arith- methic is applicable to all countable objects, that 2 plus 2 make 4, irrespective of whether the counted objects are apples, atoms or galaxies.
The answer to this is as follows. Not just in the example quoted by way of simple illustration, but in the development of system theory, the question is not the application of well-known mathematical expressions. Rather, problems are posed that are novel and partly far from solution. As mentioned, the method of classical science was most appropriate for phenomena that either can be resolved into isolated causal chains, or are the statistical outcome of an “infinite” number of chance processes, as is true of statistical mechanics, the second principle of thermodynamics and all laws deriving from it. The classical modes of thinking, however, fail in the case of interaction of a large but limited number of elements or processes. Here those problems arise which are circumscribed by such notions as wholeness, organization and the like, and which demand new ways of mathematical thinking.
Another objection emphasizes the danger that general system theory may end up in meaningless analogies. This danger indeed exists. For example, it is a widespread idea to look at the state or the nation as an organism on a superordinate level. Such a theory, however, would constitute the foundation for a totalitarian state, within which the human individual appears like an insignificant cell in an organism or an unimportant worker in a beehive.
But general system theory is not a search for vague and superficial analogies. Analogies as such are of little value since besides similarities between phenomena, dissimilarities can always be found as well. The isomorphism under discussion is more than mere analogy. It is a consequence of the fact that, in certain respects, corresponding abstractions and conceptual models can be applied to different phenomena. Only in view of these aspects will system laws apply. This is not different from the general procedure in science. It is the same situation as when the law of gravitation applies to Newton’s apple, the planetary system, and tidal phenomena. This means that in view of certain limited aspects a theoretical system, that of mechanics, holds true; it does not mean that there is a particular resemblance between apples, planets, and oceans in a great number of other aspects.
A third objection claims that system theory lacks explanatory value. For example, certain aspects of organic purposiveness, such as the so- called equifinality of developmental processes (p. 40), are open to system-theoretical interpretation. Nobody, however, is today capable of defining in detail the processes leading from an animal ovum to an organism with its myriad of cells, organs, and highly complicated functions.
Here we should consider that there are degrees in scientific ex- planation, and that in complex and theoretically little-developed fields we have to be satisfied with what the economist Hayek has justly termed “explanation in principle.” An example may show what is meant.
Theoretical economics is a highly developed system, presenting elaborate models for the processes in question. However, professors of economics, as a rule, are not millionaires. In other words, they can explain economic phenomena well “in principle” but they are not able to predict fluctuations in the stock market with respect to certain shares or dates. Explanation in principle, however, is better than none at all. If and when we are able to insert the necessary parameters, system- theoretical explanation “in principle” becomes a theory, similar in structure to those of physics.
Source: Bertalanffy Ludwig Von (1969), General System Theory: Foundations, Development, Applications, George Braziller Inc.; Revised edition.